Policy and Procedure in Abstention: Is the Pullman Technique Proper? by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 4
Winter 1965
Policy and Procedure in Abstention: Is the Pullman
Technique Proper?
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1965) "Policy and Procedure in Abstention: Is the Pullman Technique Proper?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 40 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol40/iss2/4
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
But this reasoning seems to run contrary to the rule in tracing that a
mere showing by the cestui that the estate was augmented by the amount
of the trust is insufficient to trace the trust funds.85
POLICY AND PROCEDURE IN ABSTENTION: IS THE PULLMAN
RETENTION TECHNIQUE PROPER?
The United States Supreme Court has developed an abstention doc-
trine whereby in a case in which the federal district court properly has
jurisdiction exercise of that jurisdiction is refused, and the litigant is
left to present all or some of the issues of the case to a state tribunal to
obtain an adjudication of his rights. The basis of this practice is com-
monly referred to as the "doctrine of equitable abstention"' since the
power to decline exercise of jurisdiction was found originally in the
discretion of the chancellor sitting in equity.' However, a recent state-
ment of the Court indicates that the device is founded on principles far
broader than mere equitable considerations and is equally applicable in
suits at law.'
The abstention device, as formulated in Railroad Comnn' v. Pull-
mnn4 and applied in federal question cases, represents a judicial attempt
to adjust the interests of the states and the national government, mani-
fested in the federal judiciary. On the one hand, there is a pressing state
85. Matter of Horigan Supply Co., 2 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 1924). The soundness
of the reasoning in Rassner and Hercides can be questioned. Any creditor can make
the argument that his money benefited the estate. Might not the debtor in possession
use unsegregated taxes collected in his business dealings and prolong final adjudication,
dissipating the remaining assets in so doing? Might not creditors who rely on the dis-
torted financial picture of the debtor be misled?
1. Note, The Doctrine of Equitable Abstention, 2 RAcE REr.. L. REP. 1222 (1957);
Note, J udicial Abstention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COL. L. Rnv. 749
(1959).
2. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18
(1943) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
3. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), the
Court upheld an abstention order in an eminent domain proceeding despite its recogni-
tion that eminent domain has been classified for some purposes as a proceeding at law.
The Court indicated that, although the prior abstention cases it relied on had been
equitable, those cases did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure. They were
thought rather to "reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism." Id. at 28. The
fact that the prior cases were in equity appears to be a matter of coincidence, a result
following from the nature of the relief usually sought (i.e., injunction of the application
of state law to the complainant). In this context, the broad discretionary power of the
chancellor furnished a convenient means of accomplishing the desired result.
4. 312 U.S. 496.
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interest in effective formulation of state law on the basis of local judg-
ment of desirable policy.' On the other hand, there is the equally com-
pelling national interest in paramount federal rights and in the preserva-
tion of the federal forum as an institution for the timely assertion of
those rights.' In Pullman, to effectuate abstention, the court developed
the retention technique whereby the district court remits the litigants to
the state courts for adjudication of state questions while retaining juris-
diction to decide federal questions.' On first analysis this technique ap-
pears to effect a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests.
However, it remains to be seen (1) whether the federal courts are cor-
rect in their assessment of the extent to which the principles of federalism
require deferral of the exercise of federal jurisdiction to allow the state
process to give content to the state-created relationships, and (2) whether
the retention device accords with traditional considerations of the full-
ness of the judicial process at both the federal and state levels.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF THE ABSTENTION DEVICE
Like most complex and significant developments in law, the Pullinan
rule did not spring full-blown from the head of a judge. It was an ar-
5. "Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chan-
cellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies...." Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
6. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
416-17 (1964).
7. While abstention has been invoked in a number of other, factually distinguishable
circumstances (see Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction,
59 COL. L. Rr-v. 749, 757-66 (1959), for a summary of these other instances), the classic
Pullnan situation, where issues of both state and federal law are presented in a federal
question case, remains the most frequently recurring occasion for use of the doctrine.
See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (unconstrued
state statute); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (diversity suit on
insurance claim; question of state law was certified to the state supreme court);
Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (state statute unconstrued as to whether land-
owners would be compensated for loss of access to highway) ; Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167 (1959) (unconstrued state statute) ; City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (per curiam) (to determine if state statute imposing a
charge on public utilities for use of public streets and places applies to complainant) ;
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (state statute claimed to
make certain mineral rights imprescriptible) ; Government & Civic Employees Organizing
Comm. v. Windsor, 347 U.S. 901 (1954) (challenge of state statute pertaining to partici-
pation by public employees in a labor organization) ; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242
(1953) (unconstrued state statute regulating members of the Communist party) ; Ship-
man v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950) (unconstrued state statute regulating fishing and
shrimping industries) ; Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ;
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (unconstrued state statute) ; Alabama State Fed'n
of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945) (unconstrued state statute requiring labor or-
ganizations to file detailed annual reports and financial statements) ; Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (unconstrued state statute) ; City of Chicago
v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942) (required interpretation of city ordi-
nance and decision as to whether it conflicted with state statute).
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ticulation of policies developed by earlier judicial and legislative action.
Consequently, a fair assessment of the Pullman rule must begin with
consideration of the background and origin of the abstention device.
Two cases decided over fifty years ago drew attention to the problem
of the increased ability of federal courts of equity to invade the estab-
lishment of primary legal relationships by the states through interference
with state legislative and administrative action. The first of these cases,
Ex parte Young,' established that a state official who enforces a state
statute which is alleged to violate the federal constitution is not protected
by a state's immunity from suit in a federal court under the eleventh
amendment.9 In the second case, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,"0 the Court held that the acts of state officials under color of
their offices constitute state action within the coverage of the fourteenth
amendment and give the federal courts jurisdiction, even though the acts
are contrary to state law.
Congressional concern over the ability of federal courts to invade
the establishment of primary legal relationships by the states is evidenced
by passage of three statutes. The "three-judge act"11 limits the powers
of a single district judge by requiring that suits for interlocutory injunc-
tions against the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes
be heard by special three-judge district courts. This act also provides for
appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court." The Johnson Act 3
prohibits the district courts from enjoining enforcement of state public
utility rate orders. And, the Anti-Tax Injunction Act 4 prohibits the dis-
trict courts from enjoining the collection of any tax imposed by a state.
Passage of these enactments evidences congressional intent to limit the
power of federal courts to interfere with state processes in the establish-
ment of primary legal relationships. However, the limiting prescriptions
of the Johnson Act' 5 and the Anti-Tax Injunction Act"0 are both condi-
tioned upon the availability of a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" in
8. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
9. This decision undermined the earlier decision of In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 500-
01 (1887), in which it was held that a state official could be sued in a federal court only
if the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy at law or in equity without consideration of
the official capacity of the defendant. Har & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEIr 818 (1953).
10. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
11. Mann-Elkins Act § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
12. The "three-judge act," though not impairing the power of federal courts of
equity to enjoin state action, was evidence of congressional concern over friction in
federal-state relations arising out of the federal courts' ability to enjoin state action.
13. 48 Stat. 775 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
14. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
15. 48 Stat. 775 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
16. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
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process only where the litigant is not assured of a full and timely adjudi-
cation in the state courts.
On the judicial plane, the same considerations played a part in the
formulation of the Erie rule, which is that the quality and content which
a state has attributed to a relationship should be given expression when
that relationship is called into question in litigation in federal forums.'
Also, where a state court has thought itself bound to federal precedents
and has confined unduly the scope of state regulation, the interest in al-
lowing state processes extensive freedom to give content to primary re-
lationships has prompted the exercise of federal appellate jurisdiction."3
Other judicial efforts to align federal and state interests have re-
sulted in the development of restraints which enjoin interference by the
federal courts where the state has initiated action in a matter of common
concern. One such restraint is that the federal courts will not enjoin
state criminal prosecutions except to prevent injury of a clear, immi-
nent, and irreparable character." Another restraint is exemplified in
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,2" where it was held that an injured
party must make a reasonable effort to protect himself by recourse to
whatever non-judicial machinery the state provides or he may be told that
he has come to the federal courts prematurely.2 Still another restraint is
the state courts. Thus federal courts are allowed to interfere with state
17. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
18. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). In State Tax Comm'n v.
Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939), the judgment was vacated to allow the state court free-
dom to act.
19. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943). This is "impressively
reinforced when not merely the relations between coordinate courts but between co-
ordinate political authorities are in issue." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120(1951). "Equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even
though unconstitutional." Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1934).
But see, Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1958), where criminal sanctions
were imposed for violation of a state statute requiring segregation on public transporta-
tion vehicles and the court enjoined enforcement because there was a separate and distinct
federal cause of action to protect civil rights. This court said that Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, supra, was modified to the extent of inconsistencies.
20. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
21. Id. at 228-30. The Prentis doctrine is distinguishable from the doctrine of
"ripeness," which concerns the timing of judicial challenges of regulations and adminis-
trative interpretations not yet embodied in a final order. The Court in Prentis deemed
the statutory appeal from the decision of a state rate-making commission a part of the
legislative process and stated that considerations of "equitable fitness and propriety"
direct that the federal courts defer the exercise of jurisdiction until the completion of
"final legislative action." Id. at 229-30. The paramount consideration here was clearly
deference to the state policy-making machinery. In contrast, the paramount considera-
tion behind the ripeness doctrine is a narrower one concerning the proper function of
the judiciary: it should not intervene until a dispute has crystalized. 3 DAvs, ADmINIS-
TRATiVE LAw TREATIsE 116 (1958). Since the ripeness rule is one of judicial administra-
tion, it admits a considerably larger degree of discretion in its application.
But is there any practically significant distinction between the Prentis doctrine and
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imposed where a decree similar to the type given in Siler v. Louisville &
N. R.R.22 is rendered. In that case, the Court held that where a federal
constitutional question is involved, the district court has a duty to de-
cide the ancillary state issues first and thus, if possible, avoid unnecessary
adjudication of the federal constitutional issues. The Court later stated
that a decree in this type of case should include a provision allowing
either party to reopen the case if the questions of state law were later
decided differently and authoritatively by the state court.2" The cases
establishing these restraints indicate the same judicial concern over the
ability of federal courts to invade the establishment of primary legal obli-
gations by the states that is evident in the decisions leading to the doctrine
of abstention.
Prior to Railroad Comrn'n v. Pullman Co., 4 several important cases,
which would now be typified as abstention cases, signalled a movement
toward abstention as a primary method by which the federal courts could
avoid interference with state action. The federal courts' refusal to exer-
cise jurisdiction was grounded on the view that state courts were a more
appropriate forum for the determination of uncertain and difficult ques-
tions of state law. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co." was the
first case in this movement. The Supreme Court held that there were
doubtful and complicated state laws which could best be interpreted by the
state courts in an action then in progress. In Hawks v. Hamill,2 1 the Su-
preme Court would not grant an injunction to restrain state officials be-
cause the rights were strictly local and jurisdiction had no other basis
than the "accidents of residence" ;27 the federal courts should defer to de-
cisions of state courts out of comity. Pennsylvania v. Williams28 first
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies? HART & WECHLER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 860.
Professor Wright apparently thinks not. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL COURTS 161-62 (1963).
22. 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
23. Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290
U.S. 177, 179 (1933); Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602 (1933).
24. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
25. 279 U.S. 159, 207 (1929). A few hours prior to the institution of state court
proceedings by a local transit commission to compel compliance with the established rate
schedule, the transit company instituted this federal action to enjoin the state proceeding.
26. 288 U.S. 52 (1933). In a diversity action, complainants claimed a perpetual
franchise for a toll bridge and sought to enjoin state officers from interference with
their operation of the bridge. The state officers claimed that the franchise was void
under the state statute. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had construed the statute in
question on one occasion.
27. Id. at 61.
28. 294 U.S. 176 (1935). It was held that since the state had established a statu-
tory administrative procedure for the liquidation of insolvent building and loan associa-
tions, a federal court which had taken control of the affairs of the institution should have
surrendered jurisdiction to the state official charged with administering the statutory
procedure. Id. at 182-83. Accord, Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U.S. 186 (1935) ; Gordon v.
Washington, 295 U.S. 30 (1935).
NOTES
raised the independent doctrine of non-interference with state adminis-
trative agencies ;20 and finally, in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,"0
the Court held that a question of state law had to be decided in the state
courts so that local property rights would be determined according to the
law of the state.
The climax of this movement toward abstention occurred in Railroad
Comnn'n v. Pullman Co."' where the abstention doctrine was given its first
full expression. The commission, acting under the authority of a Texas
statute which empowered it to prevent "unjust discrimination . . . and
. ..any and all other abuses"3 2 in the operation of railroads, had directed
that an employee having the rank and position of a Pullman conductor be
continuously in charge of each Pullman sleeping car. The Pullman Com-
pany sought to enjoin this order, claiming that it was unauthorized by the
Texas statute and offensive to the Constitution. The Pullman porters,
all of whom were Negroes and none of whom were conductors, inter-
vened. They based jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship but relied
mainly upon the presence of a substantial federal question-the claim that
the order discriminated on the basis of race, a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Decision in the dispute first hinged on interpretation of the
previously unconstrued statute; if it was found not to authorize the
order, the federal contentions would not be reached. Interpreting the
statute, the district court found the order unauthorized and issued the
injunction on that basis.33 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
with directions to retain jurisdiction but to stay proceedings until the
parties could obtain a definitive interpretation of the disputed statute
from the Texas courts. The Court justified this procedure by the ability
of equity to exercise its discretion in avoiding a tentative decision which
might be replaced by a controlling decision of a state court.34 The ruling
was based partially on a policy of avoiding premature and perhaps un-
29. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. cases, 310 U.S. 573 (1940), 311
U.S. 570 (1941), involving actions to enjoin operation of state oil proration orders,
clearly exemplified abdication to administrative agencies. It was held that a federal
court should not have enjoined the operations of the commission as the state has en-
trusted the formulation and execution of policy in this highly complicated field of regu-
lation to its agency. 310 U.S. at 580-81; 311 U.S. at 575-76.
30. 309 U.S. 478 (1940). Oil was discovered under the right of way of a railroad
undergoing bankruptcy reorganization and a dispute arose as to title to the fee simple.
The state courts had given no definite decisions; and since title to the land depended on
state law the trustee in bankruptcy was directed to bring a proceeding in the state courts
to settle the issue. It must be recognized that this federal suit was in a bankruptcy court,
not a federal district court.
31. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
32. Tz-,. STAT. Ax . § 6445 (1926).
33. Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
34. 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941): "No matter how seasoned the judgment of the dis-
trict courts may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination."
253
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necessary constitutional adjudication3 5 and partially on a desire to avoid
interference with state administrative agencies and further harmonious
federal-state relations. As to the second matter, the Court observed:
Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of
a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with
state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of
the criminal law [citations omitted] ; or the administration of a
specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enter-
prises [citations omitted] ; or the final authority of a state court
to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state [citations
omitted]. These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appro-
priate to our system whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a
wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state govern-
ments' .... "
Thus, the deference paid to the state policy-making function in earlier
judicial and legislative action in delineation of the proper scope of federal
jurisdiction also played a significant role in the formulation of the
Pullman rule of abstention." But, whether the technique by which ab-
stention is accomplished in Pullman-type cases-remission of the litigants
35. Id. at 498. In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947), the
Court said that there is a policy that constitutional questions will not be decided unless
necessary to decision or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided. This is a rule basic to the federal system and the Supreme
Court's appropriate place within that structure. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 346-47 (1936) (court does not decide constitutional questions unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case) ; Liverpool, N.Y., & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners
of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (never anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it).
36. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
37. The limitations placed on the application of the abstention doctrine are consis-
tent with this rationale. Where the state law is not unsettled, abstention is not justified.
City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958) ; Public Util. Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) ; All American Airways, Inc. v. Village of Cedar-
hurst, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Catoggio v. Grogan, 149 F. Supp. 94 (N.J. 1957).
1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE & PROCEDURE § 64 (Wright ed. 1960) ; Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Recoisidered, 37 TEx. L. REv. 815, 818-19 (1959). Similarly,
where it is clear that the state statute is unconstitutional no matter how it may be con-
strued by the state courts, abstention should not be ordered. Public Util. Comm'n v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943); WRIGHT, THaE FEDERAL COURTS 172 (1963).
Similar reasoning was invoked in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), and Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962), but these cases are colored by the presence of
issues of fundamental constitutional rights. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
In both situations, little is to be gained by denying the litigant a timely assertion of
his federal rights in the federal forum. Where state law is clear, it is not likely that the
federal court will arrive at a different conclusion than the state court would. And where
the state law is unconstitutional no matter how it is construed, there is no reason to per-
mit the state court to pass on it. In these instances, the values of litigation in a federal
trial court should control.
NOTES
to the state court for decision of questions of state law and retention of
jurisdiction to decide federal questions-as further delineated in later
cases fully meets this consideration must be determined.3"
II. OBJECTIOS TO THE PULLMAN RETENTION DEVICE
"With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be at-
tended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
Constitution."3  This dictum of Chief Justice Marshall has often been
followed. 0  The consideration it implies-the affirmative right of the
litigant to invoke the aid of the federal court under a statutory grant of
jurisdiction-has played an active role in developmerft of the retention
technique in Pullman-type cases.4 In this development, Marshall's rather
formalistic reasoning has been supplemented by observations of the sub-
stantive values of trial in the federal courts. In England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Aledical Examiners, in support of its assertion that review
from the highest state court does not provide a complete substitute for an
original federal hearing, the Supreme Court noted that there are af firma-
tive practical advantages for the litigant who tries his case in the district
court:
. . . [S]uch review . . . is an inadequate substitute for the
initial District Court determination. . . . This is true as to is-
sues of law; it is especially true as to issues of fact. Limiting
the litigant to review here would deny him the benefits of a
federal trial court's role in constructing a record and making
38. An alternative line of reasoning not considered by the Court in Pulhimn sug-
gests another procedure for accomplishing the same result. Where there has been no
definitive interpretation of state law, it may be that the undefined state provision does
not conflict with federal policy in such a manner as to present a "case or controversy"
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article III of the Constitution. Cf. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 437 (1964) (separate opinion).
Poe v. Ullman, 376 U.S. 497 (1961), presents, in a different context, pertinent considera-
tions regarding the interpretation of state law and its bearing on the jurisdiction issue of
whether there is a justiciable controversy. Note that the result of adoption of the ra-
tionale suggested, a finding of no jurisdiction in appropriate cases, would avoid the
procedural aberration the Pidlinan doctrine has caused (see, e.g., text accompanying notes
43-54 infra).
39. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
40. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1936); United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300, 307 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R.I.,
& P. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 387 (1925); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910) ;
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ; Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148
U.S. 529, 534 (1893).
41. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1963).
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fact findings. How the facts are found will often dictate the
decision of federal claims.42
Thus, the technique used in Pullman, retention of jurisdiction over
the cause and remission of the parties to the state courts for litigation of
the state issue, is based in part on the individual litigant's "right" to an
original federal hearing of his federal claims. On first analysis, the re-
tention device appears to effect a reasonable compromise between the con-
flicting interests involved: the state is given an opportunity to establish
primary legal relationships; the litigant's original choice of the federal
forum for adjudication of his federal claims is preserved; and the district
court is provided a means for avoiding a possibly unnecessary constitu-
tional decision. However, as it has been developed in recent cases, the
Pullman doctrine appears to be clearly inadequate to the purpose it seeks
to serve.
The content of the retention device was thrown into clearer light in
the England case.4" An earlier case, Government & Civic Employees Or-
ganizing Comm. v. Windsor," established that the state court must have
the opportunity to decide the question of state law "in light of" the con-
stitutional objections presented to the district court.45  If the litigant in-
terpreted Windsor as requiring a full-dress presentation of his federal
claims in the state court, he was forced to decide whether to present only
the state issues to the state court and then run afoul of Windsor on his re-
turn to the federal court or to present both federal and state issues to the
state court and run the risk of a subsequent plea of res judicata in the
federal forum." In England, the litigants chose the latter course and suf-
fered dismissal at the hands of the district court." The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court to decide the federal
issues.4 The Court stated that where an abstention order remits the liti-
gant to the state courts he has the right to return to the federal district
court for litigation of his federal claim.49 Thus, the door to the federal
42. Id. at 416-17. An additional value of statutory federal question jurisdiction
may be to insure to litigants an impartial forum for the presentation of federal claims
where the litigant fears that the bias of the alternative state forum would prejudice his
cause. See Bergmann, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MicH. L. RxEv.
17, 27-30 (1947).
43. 375 U.S. 411 (1963).
44. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
45. Id. at 366.
46. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521,
522 (E.D. La. 1961).
47. Ibid.
48. This relief was given as a matter of justice, since the court recognized that the
Windsor rule was reasonably susceptible of the interpretation given it by the petitioner.
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1963).
49. Id. at 415-17.
256
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court remains open, subject to Windsor's requirement that the state court
rendering the authoritative determination must have been apprised of the
constitutional issues."0  The Court in England clarified the Windsor
standard, interpreting it to mean that the litigant is obliged only to inform
the state court of his federal claims and of his intention to return to the
district court for disposition of those claims should resolution of the
state question be unfavorable."' The Court underscored its position by
stating that even if the litigant fails to make express reservation of the
federal issues he does not lose his right to return to the district court un-
less it clearly appears that he voluntarily did more than Windsor required
and fully litigated his federal claim in the state courts."
While England provided a clarification of the Windsor rule, it also
brought to light what may be fundamental defects in the retention device.
In England, the Court recognized that, on remission of the litigant to the
state court, the state court might object to the separation of issues caused
by the device. Thus, the state court, wishing to decide the question of
state law on the basis of a complete record and as relevant to a final judg-
ment on all issues in the dispute, might require the party to litigate both
state and federal issues. If the party acceded to the state court's require-
ment, the Court stated that he would not lose his "right" to return to the
federal forum, since he did not "voluntarily" choose to litigate his federal
claims in the state court. 3  Similarly, if the state court refused to enter-
tain the action on the limited basis prescribed in Windsor the Court indi-
cated that the district court should vacate its abstention order and under-
take decision of the entire dispute." This novel and important pro-
cedural effect of the retention device must result from a judgment by the
Court that the considerations favoring preservation of access to the fed-
eral forum require that normal considerations of res judicata and the full-
ness of the judicial process at the state level give way. On this same
judgment the very propriety of the retention device itself depends, but the
judgment does not appear to be an inevitable one.
The possibility of handling Pullman-type cases in another way is
suggested by the Court's treatment of those cases establishing what is re-
garded as the second major fact situation in which abstention has been
invoked: appeals from the action of state administrative agencies. In
50. Id. at 420.
51. The litigant may apprise the state court of his intentions by making an express
reservation to the disposition of the entire case. Id. at 421.
52. Id. at 421. The Court still has not indicated the exact nature and extent of the
showing required to be made before the state court.
53. Id. at 421 n. 12.
54. Ibid.
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Burford v. Sun Oil Co." the action challenged a Texas Railroad Commis-
sion order issued pursuant to the state's program of regulation of produc-
tion of oil and gas by such means as controlling the spacing of wells and
prorating the state's oil production. While jurisdiction was grounded on
an asserted federal question as well as on diversity, the Court in no way
relied on the "unnecessary constitutional adjudication" rationale of Pdl-
man in its decision ordering the district court to abstain. Rather, it noted
that the regulatory scheme in question was extremely complex and un-
certain and that the single state court granted power to review the com-
mission's order in a de novo proceeding had a special office in the case-
by-case formulation of that scheme.5" Federal review of the commis-
sion's action was held to pose such a threat of disruption to the otherwise
"unitary method for the formulation of policy . . . by the Commission
and by the state courts"5 that the district court should refuse to exercise
its jurisdiction.
The really significant point of the case lies in the fact that, despite
the presence of an asserted federal question, the Court ordered the dis-
trict court to use the technique of dismissal rather than retention of juris-
diction. The Court in Burford did not concern itself with the assertion
of the federal claim, perhaps because of its opinion that prior cases had
settled the constitutional issues relevant to the statute in question."8 How-
ever, in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., where the Court
again ordered dismissal on the authority of Burford, it expressly by-
passed consideration of the merits of the litigant's federal claim and dis-
posed of the problem by noting that the litigant had not sought state judi-
cial relief. The Court said that he "had not shown that the Alabama pro-
cedure for review of Commission orders is in any way inadequate to pre-
serve for ultimate review in this Court any federal questions arising out
of such orders."59  In both cases, the peculiar provisions authorizing ap-
55. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
56. Id. at 333.
57. Id. at 333-34. A subsequent case, Alabama Pub. Serv. Comn'1n v. Southern Ry.,
341 U.S. 341 (1951), applying the same reasoning to a situation where state law and
policy were clear and all that remaiged was application to the particular facts, has led
one writer to assert that "now abstention is likely to be applied in any attempt to enjoin
a state regulatory ody in a federal court." Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 851 (1964).
It might be argued further that abstention is desirable in this circumstance because
federal judges are not equipped to resolve questions of the specialized nature with which
administrative agencies deal. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499 (1928). However, as stated in Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959), "Procedures for
effective judicial administration presuppose a federal judiciary composed of judges well-
equipped and of sturdy character."
58. 319 U.S. 315, 328 (1943).
59. 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
peal only to a single, designated state court 0 played an important part in
the outcome. The respective state courts were viewed as having been
given a somewhat larger role in supervision of the formulation of state
policy by the state agencies than is given in the usual statutory grant of
appellate authority." The Court in England apparently thought this con-
sideration decisively distinguished the Burford-type cases from the one
before it." Nevertheless, in Burford the Court declined to characterize
the state appellate device as essentially legislative and to invoke the Prentis
doctrine, which requires a plaintiff to seek available non-judicial rem-
edies before coming to the federal court. 3 Nor did it rely on any theory
of extension of the familiar administrative procedure doctrines of ex-
haustion or ripeness. 4 If the Court thought that there were specific sig-
nificant characteristics in the state appellate device, it did not isolate or
explain them; only the comparatively greater emphasis placed on the state
court's function in specialized administrative review procedures distin-
guishes it from the ordinary appellate device. " Whether this emphasis is
a valid ground for justifying the difference of treatment between the
Burford and Pullman classes of cases is questionable. The essential fact
is that the state court has a vital policy-making function in both. If sac-
rifice of access to the federal forum for the adjudication of federal issues
was deemed inoffensive in the Burford-type cases, it is difficult to see
why preservation of that forum in Pullman-type cases is such a necessity
that ordinary principles of res judicata must fall.
Whether Burford and the cases like it can be distinguished or not,
the technical soundness of the retention device, as clarified and developed
in Windsor and England, is questionable. It must be observed that the
rule stated in Windsor-that the state court must have the opportunity to
consider the issue of state law "in light" of the litigant's federal claims-
necessarily assumes that the state and federal claims may not be separable
60. In Burford, the relevant provision was TEX. STAT. ANN., art. 6049c, § 8 (1962);
in Alabama, it was ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 46, § 79 (1958).
61. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1943); Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951).
62. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 n.5
(1964).
63. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325 (1943). For a statement of the
Prentis doctrine, see text accompanying note 20 supra.
64. See note 20 supra.
65. While the complex nature of the regulatory scheme in Burford might support
the conclusion that the result there was justified by the comparative expertise of the
state and the federal courts, the Alabanma case tends to refute this. The regulatory
standards applicable there were so clear as to negate any inference that the expertise
and experience of the state court required this result. See Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in the case. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341,
360-61 (1951).
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and that the state court may not be able to make a well considered deci-
sion of the state issue unless the context of relevant constitutional limi-
ations is clear.6"
Where the relevant constitutional precedents have established def-
inite and refined standards, the state court need not come to an independ-
ent decision on the federal matter, and the mere notice to the state court of
federal claims contemplated by Windsor is probably sufficient. But where
the federal standards are somewhat less than definite and where the view
taken of the litigant's federal claim will have a bearing on resolution of
the state claim, the state court must either uncritically accept the litigant's
federal claim on its face or go to decision of the federal matter. The only
reasonable course in this circumstance, indeed the only proper one, is for
the state court to decide the federal question. The Windsor rule breaks
down in this situation. The mere notice of the nature of the claim con-
templated by Windsor will not suffice if the state court must decide the
federal issue; the full adversary presentation which is a fundamental part
of Anglo-Saxon judicial method is necessary. The Court in England
seemed to recognize this consideration, albeit in the most oblique fashion:
The litigant denying the statute's applicability may be led not
merely to state his federal constitutional claim but to argue it,
for if he can persuade the state court that application of the
statute to him would offend the Federal Constitution, he will
ordinarily have persuaded it that the statute should not be con-
strued as applicable to him."
It is doubtful that the Court considered the negative implication that can
be drawn from its statement: where the litigant's federal claims have
merit, use of the abbreviated showing contemplated by Windsor may lead
to unconstitutional interpretations of state law which would not occur if
the state court had been afforded a full adjudication of the federal issues.
In sum, it does not appear that the Windsor rule gives full effect to
the very premise on which it is based. Of course, the state court is not
bound by the "notice" rule of Windsor and may go beyond it to require
full litigation of the federal claim,6" so the rule's defectiveness as a prac-
66. "The bare adjudication 'by the Alabama Supreme Court that the union is sub-
ject to this Act does not suffice, since that court was not asked to interpret the statute
in light of the constitutional objections presented to the District Court. If appellants'
freedom-of-expression and equal protection arguments had been presented to the state
court, it might have construed the statute in a different manner." Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957).
67. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420-21
(1964).
68. Id. at 421 n.12.
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tical guide is easily remedied. However, its real, pernicious effect may
have been that it induced the Court's dictum as to res judicata in England.
The Windsor rule, taken in isolation, tends to imply that, in the case of
inseparable state and federal issues, the state court may "take a position"
on the federal issue without actually deciding it. That the Court in
England may indeed have drawn such an inference is indicated by its
statement that "we are confident that state courts, sharing the abstention
doctrine's purpose of 'furthering the harmonious relation between state
and federal authority' . . . will respect the litigant's reservation of his
federal claims for decision by the federal courts."69  If it is really un-
necessary to go to final decision on the federal issue, the position that no
res judicata effect need be given to an apparently capricious decision of
the federal matter is easy to defend in light of the countervailing consid-
eration of preservation of the federal forum. But, again, if the deci-
sion of the federal matter is unnecessary, what is the necessity for
Windsor? The Court has yet to face squarely the significant issue of
whether its England dictum may justifiably be applied when decision of
the federal matter is a prerequisite to proper decision of the state issue.
Where this is the case, it is doubtful that "the harmonious relation be-
tween state and federal authority" is really furthered by subjecting the
state court's decision to the uncertainties of a proceeding de novo in a
federal trial court.
The relitigation of the federal question approved by the England dic-
tum is contrary to established practice. The federal courts have stead-
fastly refused to entertain collateral attacks upon state court judgments,
even though those judgments may have been founded upon erroneous de-
cision of federal questions."' The basic principle of res judicata, that
public policy requires that there be an end to litigation after the parties
have received a sufficient hearing, is a well established feature of the
federal judicial system.7' Further, the Court has observed that where
the prior decision pleaded in bar is that of a state court a district court
which entertained the action would be acting in an essentially appellate
capacity, a capacity not within the jurisdiction granted it.72
69. Ibid.
70. See, e.g., Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930) ; Rooker v. Fidel-
ity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
71. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946), and cases cited; Baltimore S.S.
Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1926).
72. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), where the plaintiff
brought a bill in the district court to have a state judgment on a constitutional issue set
aside for error, the Court, affirming the district court's order of dismissal, said:
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the cause, it
was the province and duty of the state courts to decide them. . . . If the deci-
sion was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open
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One obvious effect of application of the principle of res judicata is
preservation of the integrity and dignity of the state judicial system.7
Unless the decisions of the state courts are accorded a degree of finality,
their effectiveness in the settlement of disputes and in the case-by-case
development of state policy is substantially diminished. Of course, the
federal system requires that the finality of state judgments be qualified
to the extent that exercise of the appellate powers of the Supreme Court
are necessary to authoritative and uniform pronouncement of paramount
national rights.74 But even where the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is required, rules have been developed which protect the
province of the state court by limiting the availability and scope of re-
view. For example, the Supreme Court accepts the evidence which the
trial court reasonably believed to be true.75 Supreme Court review thus
proceeds from the record established by the trial court, and the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction is confined to its purpose of supervising rather
than supplanting state adjudication.7" However, de novo proceedings in
to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding
[citations omitted]. . . . Under the legislation of Congress no court of the
United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or
modify the judgment for errors of that character. . . . To do so would be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the District Courts is
strictly original.
Id. at 415-16.
The Court in England cites Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), for the proposi-
tion that the district court may, in certain cases brought before it on habeas corpus peti-
tions, review de novo, the state court's findings of fact on federal constitutional conten-
tions. England v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 n.8 (1964). The
Townse7nd holding has no direct relevance to the abstention problem, for it is only ap-
plicable where it appears that for some reason the petitioner failed to receive a full and
fair hearing of the constitutional issues in the state court.
73. Where a party sought in the district court to relitigate a dispute decided by a
default judgment in the state court, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
of dismissal on grounds of res judicata, adding:
If this pattern, whereby a plaintiff seeks on constitutional grounds to obtain two
trials of the same issues, first in the state court and, if a loser there, next in the
district court, is to become established, the state courts will sink into an in-
significance and obscurity not heretofore dreamed of. . . . No case has been,
nor, so long as our federal system continues, can be, cited in support of such
an extreme doctrine of the futility and impotence of state courts, their complete
subordination to the super sovereignty of federal courts.
Hudson v. Lewis, 188 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1951).
74. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (Wheat.) 304 (1816).
75. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316 (1951) ; Taylor v. Mississippi,
319 U.S. 583, 585 (1943).
76. The general rule that appellate review of state court decisions is confined to
the record and accepts the state court's conclusions of fact is not, of course, an inflexible
rule without exception. The limitations are summarized by Justice Frankfurter:
On review here of State convictions, all those matters which are usually
termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the State courts
and are not open for reconsideration by this Court. Observance of this re-
striction in our review of State courts calls for the utmost scruple. But 'issue
of fact' is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from
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a district court provide none of the safeguards to protect the integrity of
the state judicial process but instead supplant that process. The state
court judgment is reduced to an advisory opinion and no longer possesses
sufficient vitality to become final in itself; it is given the character of
law only if the district court confirms it.
In summary, the retention device is vulnerable to criticism on three
principal points. First, if the assumption of Windsor that the federal and
state questions may not be separable is correct, then it is difficult to see
how the state court can avoid deciding the federal question as a step to-
ward proper formulation of the rule of state law to be applied. The
Windsor standard is technically defective in its failure to recognize fully
the principle on which it is based. Second, consideration of the federal
question by the district court under the present retention technique may
involve relitigation of matters already decided by the state courts. This
seems to be a source of potential friction as serious as the one sought to
be avoided by the abstention doctrine itself. Third, the Court's treat-
ment of the Burford-type cases indicates that preservation of the federal
forum may not be so compelling an interest as to require the undesirable
results indicated above in Pullman-type cases. It is questionable whether
the two classes of cases can be distinguished satisfactorily; the funda-
mental fact is that state policy-making is a factor present in both, albeit
in a more subtle way in the Pullman-type cases. A fourth consideration
may be added to the foregoing matters: the retention device is produc-
tive of expense and delay in litigation ;" the interest in expeditious settle-
ment of disputes should be sacrificed only for the best of reasons. On
these grounds, it appears that if the federal courts are to defer to their
state counterparts at all the proper technique for doing so is dismissal.
Unless there are weighty, affirmative reasons for preserving the federal
forum for litigation of federal questions at any cost, respect for good
uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion incorporates standards of
conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are decisive of con-
stitutional rights. Such standards and criteria, measured against the require-
ments drawn from constitutional provisions, and their proper applications, are
issues for this Court's adjudication. . . . Especially in cases arising under
the Due Process Clause is it important to distinguish between issues of fact
that are here foreclosed and issues which, though cast in the form of deter-
minations of fact, are the very issues to review which this Court sits.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
77. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (dissenting opinion);
Note, 42 N.C.L. Rrv. 936 (1964). A severe example of the potential result can be found
in the Windsor case itself. After five years of litigation in the state and federal courts,
the parties were still without a decision on the merits. See 116 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala.
1953) ; 347 U.S. 901 (1954) ; 262 Ala 285, 78 So.2d 646 (1955) ; 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.
Ala. 1956); 353 U.S. 364 (1957) ; American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees v. Dawldns, 263 Ala. 13, 104 So.2d 827 (1958).
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judicial methods and for the proper function of the state courts in the
formulation of state policy dictates this technique."'
The two principal reasons advanced for preservation of the federal
forum, however, do not appear to have such compelling force as to require
use of the retention device. The first reason concerns administrative
convenience and regards the lower federal courts as the appropriate en-
tities for redress of claimed infringements of federal rights. The Su-
preme Court should devote its energy to solving new problems rather
than supervising old ones; it is assumed that the federal trial courts will
require less supervision than state trial courts because they will be more
likely to conform to the Supreme Court's lead and give full scope to the
Court's decisions."9 However, while the availability of a sympathetic
forum may, in certain instances, be thought essential to the adequate pro-
tection of federal rights,"0 it is indeed questionable whether the skepticism
which regards state courts as prodigals requiring constant policing is jus-
tified. The absence of general federal question jurisdiction prior to
187581 as well as the supremacy theory, which requires state courts to en-
force federal prescriptions, 2 demonstrates the significant role which the
state courts have played historically as primary guarantors of federal
rights."
The second principal reason for preserving the federal forum is that
the appellate process does not afford an adequate substitute for an initial
federal adjudication. In advancing this argument in England, 4 the Court
stressed the fact finding role of the trial court as an often decisive factor
in the adjudicatory process. The Court suggests that the "right" to re-
turn to the federal forum must be sustained upon the availability of
78. Interjurisdictional certification of state questions to the state supreme court
recently has been proposed as a solution to the problems of delay inherent in the Pullman
retention device. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) for the prototype. See also
Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-90 (1959). It seems hardly necessary to add that the certi-
fication device is subject to the same criticism as the retention device.
79. This argument is advanced in Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 COLum. L. REV. 157, 159 (1953).
80. See the text accompanying note 87 infra.
81. Prior to the Civil War Congress made only limited provision for federal juris-
diction. Specific grants of original federal jurisdiction were provided in the first Civil
Rights Act to protect the newly declared rights of Negroes. This movement culminated
in the 1875 Judiciary Act conferring general federal question jurisdiction on federal trial
courts. See HART & WEciaSLER, TEE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 727-33
(1953).
82. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223
U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
83. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518
(1955).
84. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17
(1964).
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unique elements of the federal adjudicatory process. The creative aspect
of federal adjudication having been largely deleted by invoking absten-
tion and having the state law questions decided by a state court, it remains
to be determined whether fact finding or applying law is accomplished in
federal trial courts under unique safeguards which cannot be duplicated
by the appellate route. In pointing out the critical role of fact finding,
the Court did not intimate what procedures were to be employed where
issues of fact are dispositive of both the federal and state law questions.
In such an instance the litigant could not be regarded as having received
all to which his right to a federal trial entitles him if the findings of the
state court, established by different practices, are accepted as conclusive
in the federal trial. Presumably, the federal rules governing the relation-
ship of judge and jury would require determination anew8" where, for
example, the state judge was not allowed to comment on the evidence.
However, in omitting discussion of the practices to be adopted in such
instances, the Court did not deal with the seventh amendment which pro-
vides that "no fact, tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined, in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law."'  While it cannot be anticipated that the state court action will
encompass all the facts of every controversy, the state jury's verdict, un-
der common law at least, is conclusive with regard to the facts presented
to it. Thus the federal court's fact finding will be limited to those facts
not considered by the state jury unless the Supreme Court, in aid of re-
tention, is willing to overturn the traditional conclusiveness of jury-found
facts. Since the scope of the federal fact finding process appears to be
85. See, e.g., Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). Both the Sinder and Byrd cases reject the propo-
sition that the federal trial of diversity cases may be governed by state rules pertaining
to the functions of judge and jury. The cases rely heavily upon the reasoning of Chief
Justice Hughes in Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931):
[SItate laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a federal court.
* ..Thus, a federal court is not subject to state regulations, whether found in
constitutional provisions or in statutes, providing that the court shall not give
an instruction to the jury unless reduced to writing, or that written instructions
shall 'be taken by the jury in their retirement . . . or that the court shall not
express any opinion upon the facts. . . . In a trial by jury in a federal court,
the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the
purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law.
This discharge of the judicial function as at common law is an essential factor
in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides. Id. at 94.
86. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. In Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), the Court
reasoned that the implications of the right to jury trial in federal courts must be de-
termined solely by reference to federal law if the uniformity demanded by the seventh
amendment is to be achieved. Other cases illustrate the broad scope of the amendment's
guarantee, which contemplates rights conferred by statute as well as those which pre-
viously existed at common law. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) ; cf.,
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1941) ; Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
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delineated, in effect, by the state court's determination of what matters
should be submitted to the jury in the state action, fact finding hardly
seems to be a compelling reason for extending a right to return to the
federal trial court.
Since there is some value in obtaining an accurate initial determina-
tion the contention that federal trial judges are likely to be more adept
with federal law than state judges should be considered. The contention
seems largely groundless. In addition to the fact that state courts are
routinely carrying out the provisions of federal law from day to day, the
retention technique itself requires the state courts to ascertain and apply
the relevant federal law. The implicit expectation of Pullnan that the
state court may avoid conflict with the Constitution in its construction
of the state law and the mandate of Windsor that relevant federal claims
be revealed to the state court both presuppose the ability of the state court
to deal competently with federal law. And, to the extent that the state
court is required to exercise a creative function in adapting and shaping
the federal and state prescriptions, its function is not appreciably different
than it would be if the federal action were dismissed.
This is not to say that abstention by means of dismissal would there-
fore be proper in all federal question cases. In certain types of federal
question cases initial resort to the federal judicial process for a timely
assertion of the claim or defense is arguably an integral part of the basic
right.
For example, the action of both Congress" and the judiciary afford
some basis for the proposition that a federal forum is required in cases
involving infringement of civil liberties. In Baggett v. Bidlitt,88 the Su-
preme Court stated that abstention is not proper where the consequent
delay would further impair fundamental constitutional rights already al-
leged to be impaired. In Harrison v. NAACP, 9 the Supreme Court in-
voked abstention on a petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against unconstrued Virginia statutes which allegedly were designed to
hinder fund raising, lobbying, and legal operations of the NAACP and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. The decision that the
statutes were fairly "open to interpretation" and that the district court
should have abstained to allow construction by the state courts must be
87. Section 206(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261 (1964), 42 U.S.C.
A. § 2000e-6(b) (1964), provides that "it shall be the duty" of the three-judge district
court empaneled to hear and determine cases commenced under this section "to assign
the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date . . . and to cause the case to be
in every way expedited."
88. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
89. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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evaluated in the light of the assurances given by the state's representatives
that the state would "never proceed against appellees under any of these
enactments with respect to activities engaged in during the full pendency
of this litigation."9  It might be argued that the distinction between
the Harrison and Baggett cases does not turn upon the need for expedient
federal relief but is instead founded upon the nature of the alleged statu-
tory defects; abstention would not be proper in a case founded on statu-
tory defects because no state court decision would avoid the constitutional
question where the statute is invalid on its face. The opinion, however,
is devoid of any holding that the unconstitutionality could not be cured
by state court construction. Instead the Court expressed "doubt, in the
first place, that a construction of oath provisions, in light of the vague-
ness challenge, would avoid or fundamentally alter the constitutional is-
sue raised in this litigation,"91 and proceeded to the ultimate grounds of
decision-subjecting constitutionally protected conduct to further inter-
ference through abstaining and requiring protracted litigation is an abuse
of the trial courts' discretion. The exigency of authoritative determina-
tion where dealing with matters which "abut upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms"92 is underscored by the fact that the Su-
preme Court did not remand the case so that the district court might pro-
ceed to adjudicate the merits but instead decided the constitutional ques-
tion itself.93
The principles underlying abstention are unchanged. Indeed, where
the line dividing state regulation and federal protection of civil liberties
is tenuous, it may be argued that the need for a "filtering" process where-
by state courts enmesh federal and state prescriptions into a composite
body of law, is accentuated. 4 However, deferrence to state processes
90. Id. at 179.
91. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1964).
92. Id. at 372.
93. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), points up the necessity of af-
fording adequate procedures for the timely assertion of civil liberties. A conviction for
exhibiting a motion picture without having previously obtained a license was overturned
on the grounds that the state procedures for obtaining review of the censor's denial of
a license application were too burdensome. The interim following a wrongful denial
would deter constitutionally protected conduct and therefore amount to an effective
abridgement of the right to engage in such conduct.
94. Recognition of the principle that the state courts should be allowed sufficient
opportunity to align state law with governing federal provisions and the necessity that
this objective be balanced against the need of timely vindication of civil rights in a
sympathetic forum appears to have influenced Congress' drafting of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The act provides that for unlawful denial of service in places of public accom-
modation no civil action shall be brought, where the conduct complained of is proscribed
by local law, before the expiration of thirty days after service of notice on the ap-
propriate state or local authorities. And, the district courts are granted authority to stay
federal proceedings pending local enforcement proceedings. Civil Rights Act § 204(c),
78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(c) (1964). Similar provisions are contained
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cannot be permitted to negate or detract from the fullness or adequacy
of the federal judicial process available to redress transgressions upon
civil liberties. While the Baggett decision does not appear to prohibit
abstention in such instances, it does require that the district court balance
the opposing considerations. Practical considerations, such as whether
the likelihood that the state court could alleviate the problem is sufficient
to occasion further delay of the federal proceedings, must be entrusted to
the sound discretion of the trial court.
III. CONCLUSION
A critical analysis of the PullmaIn technique of retention of jurisdic-
tion must inquire whether it can properly fulfill its apparently dual ob-
jectives of preserving to litigants the opportunity to secure an original
hearing in the district court on federal questions and enabling both federal
and state courts to fulfill their proper function in the federal system. It
is the ultimate contention of this note that the device cannot.
It may be said generally that where Congress has charged the dis-
trict courts with the duty to adjudicate controversies properly before
them, those courts should afford the litigants a full, federal adjudication.
However, it has been demonstrated that where the interest in access to a
federal forum has posed a danger of conflict with matters properly with-
in the concern of the states, in many instances the interest in access to
federal forum has given way.
It is entirely consistent with this history that, when the content of
a rule of state law is called into question in the course of constitutional
adjudication, the federal court should defer to a state tribunal, giving it
the opportunity to shape state policy within the broad confines of federal
prescription. As a general proposition, abstention is sound. But it does
not seem possible to preserve the federal forum at the same time through
retention of jurisdiction, without either restricting the very role thus as-
signed to the state court by inducing it to accept abbreviated exposure of
federal claims under the Windsor rule or sacrificing the integrity of that
court by refusing under the Engladu dictum to accord to its decision the
normal finality due a full adjudication of all the issues, federal as well as
state. In order to fulfill the role assigned to it by the abstention doctrine,
the state court cannot be restricted to dealing in abstractions; it must be
free to bring all the resources of its judicial processes to bear upon the
problem. Having thus resolved the problem through adjudication, the
in other sections of the act, e.g., Civil Rights Act § 706(b), 78 Stat 259 (1964), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1964), pertaining to unlawful employment practices, and are
generally applicable in criminal as well as civil actions with the time limitation varying
from thirty to sixty days.
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interest in the harmonious working of the federal system is best served
by dismissing any further trial proceedings and relegating the litigants to
the appellate processes. It is submitted that these considerations far out-
weigh the values of litigation in the federal forum and that the litigant's
individual interest in access to that forum must give way.
However, where there is special urgency, as in those instances where
the exercise of civil liberties would be further deterred if subjected to the
delay of abstention by dismissal, the relevant considerations favor ex-
pedient and full original proceedings in the district court.
